Why Not Privacy By Default?

We live in a Track-Me world, one from which opting out is often not possible. Firms collect reams of data about all of us, quietly tracking our mobile devices, our web surfing, and our email for marketing, pricing, product development, and other purposes. Most consumers both oppose tracking and want the benefits tracking can provide. In response, policymakers have proposed that consumers be given significant control over when, how, and by whom they are tracked through a system of defaults (i.e., “Track-Me” or “Do-Not-Track”) from which consumers can opt out. The use of a default scheme is premised on three assumptions. First, that for consumers with weak or conflicted preferences, any default chosen will be “sticky,” meaning that more consumers will stay in the default position than would choose it if an affirmative action were required to reach the position. Second, that those consumers with a fairly strong preference for the opt-out position—and only those consumers—will opt out. Third, that where firms oppose the default position, they will be forced to explain it in the course of trying to convince consumers to opt out, resulting in well-informed decisions by consumers. This article demonstrates that for tracking defaults, these assumptions may not consistently hold. Past experience with the use of defaults in policymaking teaches that Track-Me defaults are likely to be too sticky, Do-Not-Track defaults are likely to be too slippery, and neither are likely to be information-forcing. These conclusions should inform the “Do-Not-Track” policy discussions actively taking place in the U.S., in the E.U., and at the World Wide Web Consortium. They also cast doubt on the privacy and behavioral economics literatures that advocate the use of “nudges” to improve consumer decisions about privacy

Consumer-Facing Competition Remedies: Lessons from Consumer Law for Competition Law

Assigning consumers the task of disciplining markets is frequently attempted but rarely achieved. We teach financial literacy classes with the hope that consumers will avoid overly-risky and overly-costly financial products. We require calorie labels with the hope that consumers will use them to reduce obesity. We pre-select a no-overdraft default with the hope that consumers will stick with the default and avoid overdraft fees. None of these approaches are terribly effective at achieving the ends sought because, in each instance, the intervention—the classes, the disclosures, or the defaults—produce unexpected heterogeneous consumer responses and are met with a barrage of firm countermeasures. So too with consumer-facing competition remedies, the firm subject to the remedy gets the last move and can run circles around the remedy. Reducing firm access to consumer data holds some promise for slowing the speed at which firms can run; microtargeted tactics are likely to be more effective than generic plays in undercutting consumer-facing remedies, and firms need personal data to microtarget. By changing firm incentives, performance-based remedies promise to cut through this dynamic entirely, and while their effectiveness in the competition realm remains to be seen, they should be preferred to the consumer-facing remedies that have already failed. Parallel to the imposition of performance-based competition remedies on firms that have engaged in anticompetitive conduct, competition authorities must engage in market-wide regulation that facilitates effective consumer comparison shopping and therefore substantive competition. Given widespread concern about concentration in so many industries today, competition law may need to break new legal ground to remedy and constrain anticompetitive behavior

Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Literacy Education

Financial literacy education has long been promoted as key to consumer financial well-being. Yet the claim has never had more than negligible statistically significant empirical support. This review (1) sets forth the model of financial literacy education underlying public support for these programs today, (2) identifies pervasive and serious limitations in existing empirical research used by policymakers as evidence of the effectiveness of this education, and (3) recommends a number of alternative public policies suggested by the existing research

Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Literacy Education

Financial literacy education has long been promoted as key to consumer financial well-being. It is widely embraced as an effective alternative to substantive legal regulation. Yet its effectiveness has never had more than negligible empirical support. This review (1) sets forth the model of financial literacy education subscribed to by policymakers today, (2) identifies pervasive and serious limitations in existing empirical research used by policymakers as evidence of the effectiveness of this education, and (3) recommends a number of alternative public policies suggested by the existing research. Researchers should be particularly cautious in the presentation of their findings, so that academic work will contribute to the public policy discussion empirical, rather than ideological, assessments of financial literacy education

Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Literacy Education

Financial literacy education has long been promoted as key to consumer financial well-being. It is widely embraced as an effective alternative to substantive legal regulation. Yet its effectiveness has never had more than negligible empirical support. This review (1) sets forth the model of financial literacy education subscribed to by policymakers today, (2) identifies pervasive and serious limitations in existing empirical research used by policymakers as evidence of the effectiveness of this education, and (3) recommends a number of alternative public policies suggested by the existing research. Researchers should be particularly cautious in the presentation of their findings, so that academic work will contribute to the public policy discussion empirical, rather than ideological, assessments of financial literacy education

Against Financial Literacy Education

The dominant model of regulation in the United States for consumer credit, insurance, and investment products is disclosure and unfettered choice. As these products have become increasingly complex, consumers’ inability to understand them has become increasingly apparent, and the consequences of this inability more dire. In response, policymakers have embraced financial literacy education as a necessary corollary to the disclosure model of regulation. This education is widely believed to turn consumers into “responsible” and “empowered” market players, motivated and competent to make financial decisions that increase their own welfare. The vision is of educated consumers handling their own credit, insurance, and retirement planning matters by confidently navigating the bountiful unrestricted marketplace. Although the vision is seductive, promising both a free market and increased consumer welfare, the predicate belief in the effectiveness of financial literacy education lacks empirical support. Moreover, the belief is implausible, given the velocity of change in the financial marketplace, the gulf between current consumer skills and those needed to understand today’s complex non-standardized financial products, the persistence of biases in financial decisionmaking, and the disparity between educators and financial services firms in resources with which to reach consumers. Harboring this belief may be innocent, but it is not harmless; the pursuit of financial literacy poses costs that almost certainly swamp any benefits. For some consumers, financial education appears to increase confidence without improving ability, leading to worse decisions. When consumers find themselves in dire financial straits, the regulation through education model blames them for their plight, shaming them and deflecting calls for effective market regulation. Consumers generally do not serve as their own doctors and lawyers and for reasons of efficient division of labor alone, generally should not serve as their own financial experts. The search for effective financial literacy education should be replaced by a search for policies more conducive to good consumer financial outcomes

Finance-Informed Citizens, Citizen-Informed Finance: An Essay Occasioned by the International Handbook of Financial Literacy

Purpose: Throughout the world, the dominant discourse treats “financial literacy” as both necessary and sufficient to improve the well-being of individuals and society.Findings: This essay argues that financial literacy is neither, and that promoting financial literacy is a perverse way to address the inadequate retirement funding, overindebtedness, financial crises, and other social ills that have inspired governments and educators to pursue it. In its place, this essay suggests that the aim of financial education ought to be to foster finance-informed citizens, who have the capacity for civic engagement that can create citizen-informed economic policies and financial regulation

Against Financial Literacy Education

The dominant model of regulation in the United States for consumer credit, insurance, and investment products is disclosure and unfettered choice. As these products have become increasingly complex, consumers’ inability to understand them has become increasingly apparent, and the consequences of this inability more dire. In response, policymakers have embraced financial literacy education as a necessary corollary to the disclosure model of regulation. This education is widely believed to turn consumers into “responsible” and “empowered” market players, motivated and competent to make financial decisions that increase their own welfare. The vision is of educated consumers handling their own credit, insurance, and retirement planning matters by confidently navigating the bountiful unrestricted marketplace. Although the vision is seductive, promising both a free market and increased consumer welfare, the predicate belief in the effectiveness of financial literacy education lacks empirical support. Moreover, the belief is implausible, given the velocity of change in the financial marketplace, the gulf between current consumer skills and those needed to understand today’s complex non-standardized financial products, the persistence of biases in financial decisionmaking, and the disparity between educators and financial services firms in resources with which to reach consumers. Harboring this belief may be innocent, but it is not harmless; the pursuit of financial literacy poses costs that almost certainly swamp any benefits. For some consumers, financial education appears to increase confidence without improving ability, leading to worse decisions. When consumers find themselves in dire financial straits, the regulation through education model blames them for their plight, shaming them and deflecting calls for effective market regulation. Consumers generally do not serve as their own doctors and lawyers and for reasons of efficient division of labor alone, generally should not serve as their own financial experts. The search for effective financial literacy education should be replaced by a search for policies more conducive to good consumer financial outcomes